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Epistemological Issues in Counselor Preparation: An Examination of
Constructivist and Phenomenological Assumptions
Abstract
This article clarifies how the epistemological issues of belief justification and truth values relate to
counselor preparation methods. Exploring constructivism and phenomenology in detail as well as
aspects of positivism relevant to counselor education, we highlight how specific philosophical
assumptions about student learning inform counselor education. We propose that counselor educators
and researchers may benefit from exploring phenomenology as a supplementary instructional approach
to constructivism.
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The purpose of this article is to make some of the subtler aspects of epistemology
immediately relevant to counselor educators by clarifying important epistemological issues
without distorting or oversimplifying them. This is a challenge that we hope proves to be of
immediate value since the current lack of discourse on conceptual aspects of pedagogy in
counselor education is of concern (see Korcuska, 2016). We approach this topic from the stance
that constructivism and phenomenology serve as distinct epistemological lenses through which
to view the process of learning. We clarify some tenets of constructivism as a response to
positivism and indicate how phenomenology not only fits into this epistemological debate but
uniquely serves the interest of counselor preparation. By providing a clear description of
epistemological issues within constructivism and phenomenology, we hope to engage the
counselor education community in a rigorous discussion on the merits of phenomenology as a
unique and valuable pedagogical enterprise (Wilkinson & Dewell, 2019; Wilkinson & Hanna,
2016).
The Growth of Constructivism in Education
For the past thirty years, constructivism has played an increasingly important role in
educational theory, research, and practice (Confrey & Kazak, 2006). It has evolved rapidly and
extensively from its beginnings in the cognitively-oriented genetic epistemology of Piaget (1954)
and culturally-oriented social learning theory of Vygotsky (1965) to incorporate the works of
Halliday (Pritchard & Woollard, 2010; Wells, 1994), Maturana (Cunningham, 1992; Proulx,
2008), and Dewey (Hickman, Neubert, & Reich, 2009; Johnston, 2009; Prawat & Floden, 1994).
While this variety of unique perspectives has resulted in the development of numerous
instructional practices (e.g., scaffolding; guided instruction) and teaching approaches (e.g.,
constructionism; problem-based learning), constructivism remains intimately connected to the

broadly encompassing notion that “communication and understanding are a matter of interpretive
construction on the part of experiencing subjects” (von Glaserfeld, 1981, p. 194). This statement
is general enough to encompass constructivism in its cognitive, social, radical, and critical forms
as applied to such diverse areas as mathematics education (Confrey & Kazak, 2006; Ernst, 1998;
Lochhead, 1991), science education (Bachtold, 2013; Dorion, 2010; Tobin, 1993), instructional
technology (Duffy & Jonassen, 1992; Karagiorgi & Symeou, 2005; Payne, 2009), educational
psychology (Prawat & Floden, 1994; Pritchard & Woollard, 2010; Tobias, 2010), and counselor
education (Guiffrida, 2005; McAuliffe & Eriksen, 1999).
Constructivist teaching methods emerged to deal with important concerns regarding
traditional educational approaches, particularly surrounding those teacher-centered instructional
practices that regard learners as passive recipients of information (Pegues, 2007). The
constructivist movement has effectively shifted educational discourse in a learner-centered
direction, making student needs and considerations a central educational priority. For counselor
educators, the foundation of a constructivist epistemology is that learners uniquely construct,
rather than gather or acquire, knowledge (Nelson & Neufeldt, 1998). This is an intuitively
appealing perspective because it corresponds with the clear distinction between learner-centered
and instructor-centered practices. However, it is also important to recognize that constructivist
practices rest upon a specific set of epistemological assumptions that are all too often left
unquestioned (Phillips, 1995; Tobias & Duffy, 2009).
There is immense value in aligning pedagogical practices with epistemological
assumptions insofar as reconciling the two enhances the soundness of our teaching methods
(Kirschner, 2009). We contend that a basic grasp of epistemological concepts is a prerequisite for
developing an ideologically-sound teaching approach. Our intention is to clarify why this is

particularly important in counselor education, as well as to show how a phenomenological
pedagogy can provide a valuable supplementary approach to constructivist methods. To address
these ideas, this article will clarify and evaluate the epistemological tenets of constructivism in
contrast to phenomenology and demonstrate their relative impact on learners in counselor
education.
Epistemological Foundations of Constructivism and Phenomenology
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and knowledge justification. As an epistemology,
constructivism serves as an explanation for the nature of knowing rather than as an educational
theory of learning principles (Schunk, 2012). However, its epistemological stance has distinct
implications for educational practice. The constructivist position is that learners uniquely
construct, rather than gather or acquire, knowledge. In terms of educational practice, this means
that knowledge is not “out there” in the world to be discovered. Rather, it is constructed within
subjective experience and is contextualized in terms of social or communal meaning-making
(Bredo, 2006). Phenomenology takes a very different position, maintaining that knowledge is
directly acquired by observing and apprehending phenomena in our immediate experience
(Husserl, 1970). For educational practice, this means that there is indeed a discoverable world
“out there” and that we can refine the accuracy of our knowledge of how it is given to us in
consciousness by rigorously investigating our direct experience of phenomena.
The distinction is crucial because any presumption as to what constitutes knowledge is
intimately linked to our decision-making process as educators. Our beliefs as to how students
learn has a direct impact on how we think about, design, and implement a sound teaching
approach (Kirschner, 2009). In other words, our epistemological assumptions influence our
teaching practices regardless of whether or not we have thoughtfully considered the topic of

epistemology. To clarify the essential implications of the issue at hand, the following sections
define and explore the epistemological tenets that ground constructivism and phenomenology.
Points of consideration include how each view justifiable beliefs and valid truth claims in
relation to the principles of coherentism and foundationalism, as well as the consequences of
these views in regard to subjective experience and the realism-idealism distinction.
Justifiable Beliefs: Between Coherentism and Foundationalism
A primary constructivist position involves replacing truth as an absolute process within an
absolute reality with the notion of truth as relative inquiry-in-practice (Kirschner, 2009; Schunk,
2012). This distinction parallels, and is partially derived from, the longstanding debate in
philosophy over what justifies truth claims, or propositions that one holds to be true (for a
review, see Feldman, 2003). The constructivist position most closely aligns with epistemological
coherentism, as rooted in Quine’s (1990) studies of ontological relativism. Coherentism holds
that a belief is justified when it is supported by other justifiable beliefs in such a manner as to
establish a coherent belief structure (Lehrer, 2010). This means that all personal beliefs are
constructed upon other personal beliefs in a continuous cycle, ad infinitum. In practical terms, it
means that belief structures require only internal consistency, rather than objective evidence, to
be justified. As such, personal beliefs cannot be legitimately questioned so long as those beliefs
are part of a coherently structured belief system and there is no conflict among existing beliefs
within the mental construction (Feldman, 2003; Lehrer, 2010).
Coherentism stands in stark contrast to foundationalism, which holds that a belief is
justified only when it corresponds with a verifiable basis of evidential truth (Alston, 2010). In
foundationalism, such evidence aligns with the scientific agenda of positivism, or the idea that
there are logical, empirical, or otherwise discoverable grounds to all truth claims. As such,

foundationalism is the epistemological basis for “traditional” teaching approaches that suggest
justified beliefs must be supported by direct and verifiable evidence. Alternatively, coherentism
reflects a relativistic epistemological stance that belief justification is context-dependent, or
grounded in personal and historical situations (Lehrer, 2010). So, whereas foundationalism aligns
with the so-called “modernist” view that human beings as rational subjects can arrive at clearly
delineated truths about the world, coherentism aligns with the so-called “postmodernist” notion
that human beings are not rational subjects who discover the world as it is, but are interpreters
who craft unique and context-dependent meanings about the world (Susen, 2015).
However, there remains a third position to consider. Foundherentism - a hybrid term that
merges foundationalism and coherentism - asserts that a belief is justified when it is both
supported by direct and verifiable evidence and aligns within a coherent belief structure (Haack,
1993). It thus embraces both the foundationalist view that verifiable experience is a necessary
condition for justified beliefs and the coherentist view that justified beliefs exist within contextdependent systems. However, it denies the more extreme positions of both foundationalism (i.e.;
justifiable beliefs must be based upon fundamental truths) and coherentism (i.e.; there are no
fundamental truths, only coherent belief structures). Numerous scholars have argued that
phenomenology adheres to neither foundationalism nor coherentism (see Føllesdal, 1988; Hopp,
2008; Zahavi, 2003), insofar as Husserl “takes adequate and conclusive truth as a regulative
ideal, that is, a goal attainable only in infinite endeavor” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 67). As such, truth is
neither “out there” in the so-called “external world” waiting to be discovered, nor an
undiscoverable subjective construction. Instead, the world and the subject are indistinguishable
due to intersubjective constitution (Husserl, 1931; also see Zaner, 1970).
Although the term intersubjective constitution sums up a complicated set of ideas and

arguments, its implications related to foundherentism is simple to grasp via comparison to other
epistemologies. Foundationalism claims that a belief is justified when it is grounded in basic
beliefs that correspond with the reality of the external world, thereby presupposing that the
external world is directly accessible to knowing subjects. Coherentism asserts that a belief is
justified when it is part of a coherent system of beliefs, presupposing that the world is not
directly accessible to the knowing subject. Foundherentism, as an epistemological basis for
phenomenology, claims that a belief is justified when the knowing subject directly experiences
the external world and then compares her observations with other knowing subjects, thereby
presupposing that there is indeed a directly accessible external world but that the observations of
individual subjects may vary (Haack, 1993). As such, a basic belief is justified only insofar as it
accurately corresponds with descriptive observations made by other knowing subjects. It is this
critical reconciliation of evidence-seeking in foundationalism with contextual mutuality in
coherentism that allows phenomenology to bridge the gap between constructivism and
positivism.
The phenomenological approach provides a means to enhance counselor preparation
methods because its fits naturally between coherentism and foundationalism. Again, this is
apparent when comparing positivist, constructivist, and phenomenological approaches to
instruction. The positivist educator assumes that there are verifiably correct answers to problems,
provides learners with those answers to build correct knowledge, and tests learners to ensure
ideas have been accurately retained. Grounded in foundationalism, learners are viewed, so to
speak, as “intellectual sponges” into which knowledge can be fluidly transferred. The
constructivist educator assumes that there are few correct answers to problems, guides learners to
build increasingly complex networks of internally-coherent mental constructions and asks

learners to determine whether those networks of ideas and beliefs are indeed coherent. Grounded
in coherentism, learners are viewed as subjective agents with an inherent capacity to formulate
coherent ideas and belief structures.
Alternatively, the phenomenological counselor educator assumes that the path to
discovering correct answers to problems begins with rich descriptions provided by learners about
the phenomenon under investigation, guides learners in the process of questioning, identifying,
and investigating their immediate experience of a given phenomenon, and works with learners
both to examine their own self-discovered evidence and to compare it to the experience of others
investigating the same phenomenon. By moving the focus away from mental constructions and
towards the direct exploration of any given conscious experience, the phenomenological
approach asks counseling students to trade abstractions and mental constructions for experiential
awareness and immediate apperceptions. Husserl held that everything a person is conscious of referred to as intentionality - is subject to phenomenological investigation, including
consciousness itself (Husserl, 1931). This includes ideas, thoughts, images, behaviors, acts of
volition, and even understanding itself. Phenomenological learning takes place at this
fundamental level of direct observation and apprehension - the foundation of the scientific
method.
Phenomenological investigation thereby holds a middle ground that takes the reality of
complex phenomena seriously without reducing that reality to a set of personal constructions.
Learning need not be thought of as constructed to account for various subjective phenomena.
Husserl (2000) - with his motto “back to the things themselves” (p. 168) - sought to escape the
limits of subjective vagueness and arrive at some certainty of the nature of both world and self.
There is indeed a world of experience to be discovered, and we can acquire intimate knowledge

of it through direct, rigorous, and verifiable investigation. We can also learn how consciousness
acts upon perception in such a way as to affect how persons view their own experiences. This
idea presupposes that there are individual variations in how subjects perceive experiences and
thereby justify beliefs, just as constructivism claims. However, the phenomenological
perspective further notes that variations in this so-called act of constitution must be directly
investigated and compared with the perceptions of others to determine why such variations occur
and whether those variations signify a relevant distortion in perception or belief (Zaner, 1970).
Truth Values: Between Idealism and Realism
Coherentism as an approach to belief justification is distinct from, but intimately related to,
the coherence theory of truth that denies an objective or directly accessible external world
(Ultanir, 2012). It thus rejects the correspondence theory of truth upheld by foundationalism,
which asserts that truth denotes a correspondence between what is known and the precise nature
of an absolute reality (Feldman, 2003; Russell, 1912). Guided by epistemological coherentism,
constructivists assert that abandoning the correspondence theory of truth frees us to realize that
truth is a subjective construction without any correspondence to a verifiable reality (Nola &
Irzik, 2005). Constructivists thus highlight the virtually infinite number of creative ways in
which knowledge structures can be coherently organized and thus deny any grounds for objective
truth claims. Beyond rejecting the foundationalist requirement for evidentiary support in belief
justification, constructivists also sponsor the viewpoint that objective evidence is not needed to
justify a belief because truth itself is a subjective phenomenon.
This line of thought is a consequence of epistemological idealism, or the view that our
knowledge of the world is mediated by mental representations or models of the world rather than
being a direct depiction of the world as it is in-itself (Feldman, 2003). Aligned with this view,

most constructivists maintain that what may be known about an object (e.g., an apple's color,
shape, taste, and size) is strictly “in” the observer's mind rather than “in” the object because the
objective world, though perhaps existing, remains inaccessible to our direct apprehension
(Feldman, 2003; Phillips, 1995). In contrast, the epistemological realist position maintains that
the physical world independent of the knower is directly accessible. This realism-idealism
dispute is an epistemological restatement of the debate over Cartesian dualism, which tends to
force a choice between the individual knower as arbiter of reality and the physical world as
foundation of reality. Most constructivists tend to deviate from a purely idealistic stance by
acknowledging that the physical world exists while maintaining that the physical world should
only be referenced in terms of how it frames human experience vis a vis the construction of
mental representations, or mental models (Phillips, 1995; Schunk, 2012).
According to Nola and Irzik (2005), this results in a uniquely adapted version of the
coherence theory of truth: that truth conditions of propositions can only be other propositions,
which are derived from an ever-evolving construction of assimilated propositions. While this
may sound confusing, it is actually a very simple principle that serves as a primary constructivist
tenet, namely that:
we can never compare either our experiences of, or our beliefs about, reality with how
reality is because, in order to check whether our experiences or beliefs correspond with
reality, further experiences or beliefs must always intervene. Thus, we can never have
direct knowledge, or more strongly any knowledge at all, of how reality is (Nola & Irzik,
2005, p. 149-150).
In other words, knowledge according to constructivism is continually constructed by epistemic
agents who are restricted to internal representations of the inaccessible external world. As such,

knowledge can only ever be viable, not valid. This perspective is not new to constructivism,
having long been upheld by various anti-realist advocates as the Inaccessibility of Reality
Argument, or IRA (Nola & Irzik, 2005). While the credibility of this position has been largely
undone by epistemologists in recent years (see Nola & Irzik, 2005), it has nonetheless continued
to influence constructivist practices.
The issue of viability is apparent in terms of the practical consequence of a constructivist
take on knowledge in the classroom. Through various educational practices, constructivism seeks
to replace the notion of the teacher as the transmitter of correct knowledge of reality with a
pedagogical approach that emphasizes the importance of adaptive and personalized teaching
methods that fit student needs (Boghossian, 2009; Merrill, 1991). As previously noted, this
transition was spurred by a legitimate and well-intentioned desire to place student needs and
considerations at the center of the learning process. However, there are unintended consequences
in basing truth claims on viability rather than validity. As stated by Nola and Irzik (2005), “the
conflation of knowledge with belief and the replacement of truth by viability [has] resulted in the
loss of the idea of a right and wrong answer”, quite often leaving constructivist instructors
“reluctant to tell their students that their representations may sometimes be misconceptions, and
that their constructions can be misconstructions” (p. 177).
Such equivocation of knowledge with belief is not something to be taken lightly. Insofar as
there are substantial bodies of counseling research and knowledge that students must acquire to
become effective practitioners, such an equivocation may leave many students underprepared or
otherwise confused (Sewall, 2000). The learning needs of novices are vastly different from those
of established professionals and the methods of inquiry used in a field of study may not
necessarily be the best means of teaching its associated content (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark,

2006). Epistemological principles can influence the welfare of learners through an instructor's
philosophical allegiance to a certain mindset, as when constructivist practices result in the
development of naïve mental models rather than accurate, or well-articulated, mental models
(Merrienboer & Kirschner, 2007; Wilkinson & Dewell, 2019).
Naïve mental models tend to reflect “misunderstandings or misconceptions where learners
are unaware of the underlying relationships between elements” (Kirschner, 2009, p. 151). In a
similar vein, Husserl (1965) made consistent reference to the importance of overcoming the
natural attitude through a process of relentless investigation into our own primary
preconceptions, presuppositions, and schema. An integral part of Husserl’s (1931) method
included instructions on how to move out of the natural attitude toward the goal of examining
prepredicative or preconceptual experience (i.e. sense experience independent of judgment). It is
in this mode that we can grasp how “the real world indeed exists” (Husserl, 1931, p. 14) by
means of our direct, intuitive apperception of experience. While the world is indeed there - all by
itself and on its own - phenomenology indicates that the world cannot be divorced from the
constituting consciousness of the investigator, of which it is an integral part.
The result of this line of inquiry is not a declaration of a reality independent of, and without
regard to, the world as it is. From a phenomenological stance, determination of reality is not a
primary concern since such determinations are subject to a plethora of preconceptions and
judgments. Husserl instead chose to focus on the primacy of experience. As such,
phenomenology is a transcendence of both subjectivism and objectivism that allows the world to
be there as it has always been but refines our understanding of it to include subjectivity itself.
This involves arriving at original concepts that are adequately adjusted to the ground of prepredicative experience and requires stepping outside of the natural attitude (Husserl, 1931). From

this perspective, it is unsurprising that the experimental psychologists Herrnstein and Boring
(1965) described the phenomenological method as “the most primitive kind of observation of
experience that it is possible for man to achieve” (p. 611).
Locating a middle ground between realist and idealist perspectives was precisely the task
set forth by Husserl (1931). The phenomenological shift involves accurately describing world,
mind, and conscious perception in a disciplined and rigorously honest fashion (Hanna,
Wilkinson, & Givens, 2017). It should be noted that the phenomenological approach also allows
for an inquiry based on reason that eschews the exercise of power. Since phenomenology allows
the world to be as it is without changing anything (Husserl, 1970), the nature of the world is not
dependent on our pronouncements of it. By clarifying and refining our perceptions, beliefs, and
understandings of world and consciousness, phenomenological inquiry allows knowledge to
emerge that is not limited by cultural frameworks that mold reality according to tradition,
zeitgeist, expediency, or psychological need. Phenomenological methodology allows an egress
from views that are bound by such self-referential tendencies, which makes it a suitable
framework for confronting issues related to power and oppression.
Practical Considerations for Counselor Educators
It is important for counselor educators to consider the way in which positivist,
constructivist, and phenomenological pedagogies differ in practice. We will briefly examine
these pedagogies in light of two important areas of counselor training, namely theory acquisition
and concept formation.
Theory Acquisition
A positivist approach to teaching counseling theory focuses on the scientific evidence for or
against the veracity of any given theory (Rosenshine, 2009). In this respect, the growth of

evidence-based counseling practice reflects the positivist view that practitioners should be held
accountable for providing those counseling services that have been empirically validated through
research to meet the needs of individual clients (Norcross & Wampold, 2011). Foundationalism,
seeking the verifiable basis for evidential truth, requires proof of efficacy. As such, counselor
educators inclined towards positivism should, to maintain epistemological congruence, train
students to closely examine the evidentiary basis for particular theories rather than choose
theories based on ideological affiliation or preference.
A constructivist approach to teaching counseling theory focuses on alignment between
personal meaning and theoretical worldviews. Recognizing that all counseling theories are
equally effective in creating client change (Wampold, 2001), many counselor educators have
chosen to embrace a personal-fit model of theory acquisition (Guiffrida, 2005; Kottler, 2002;
Spruill & Benshoff, 2000). This is clearly a constructivist practice insofar as the subjective
worldview of the student aligns with a viable, theory-based interpretation of psychological
experience (Wilkinson & Hanna, 2016). Coherentism, seeking the internal consistency of belief
structures, requires proof of alignment between subjective belief and counseling practice. As
such, counselor educators inclined toward constructivism should, to maintain epistemological
congruence, train students in theories by examining the correspondence between theory-based
worldviews and the subjective worldviews of students.
A phenomenological approach to teaching theories focuses on psychological phenomena
that counseling theories seek to explain. Husserl’s (2000) motto “back to the things themselves”
(p. 168) indicates that phenomenology is primarily concerned with immediate apperceptions
rather than mere theoretical speculations. It views theoretical frameworks as abstractions that can
lead students to oversimplify complex and interconnected psychological processes (Wilkinson &

Hanna, 2016). Rather than teach students each theory separately, phenomenological pedagogy
highlights assumptions made by each theory and explores the similarities and differences therein.
For example, behavior, cognition, and emotion-based theories each claim primacy in terms of the
therapeutic change process. Rejecting this supposition, a phenomenological approach asks
students to examine the parallels among behavior, cognition, and affect as manifest in their
subjective experience (Wilkinson & Hanna, 2016). The result is that students learn that each
theory has value in particular situations (akin to the evidence-based view of positivism) via a
process that forces them to challenge assumptions and deconstruct their subjective view of
experience (akin to the meaning-making view of constructivism).
Concept Formation
A positivist approach to teaching counseling concepts focuses on valid and well-established
points of scientific consensus. Ideas should be clearly defined and explicated based upon the
standard definitions within the field and in accordance with the most recent empirical evidence.
The validity of counseling concepts for positivists is therefore found within major theories and
conceptual models that have been rigorously scrutinized and tested. For example, training
students in the cognitive-behavioral view of automatic thoughts, intermediate beliefs, and core
beliefs may involve identifying definitions, showcasing their usefulness by teaching student how
to implement particular models of cognition, and perhaps using a case vignette to highlight how
these concepts come together to inform counseling practice. The focus remains steadfastly on
ensuring students learn the accurate definitions, models, and practical applications of various
concepts in an organized and proficient manner.
A constructivist approach to teaching counseling concepts focuses on viability of
interpretations. Constructivists recognize that student interpretations are often inaccurate and so

promote teacher guidance as a normative practice (Duschl & Duncan, 2009). However, even as
subjective experience becomes a central part of exploring concepts in constructivism, the
emphasis remains on cognitive interpretations such as explanations and implications. Once
again, students might be asked to consider the relationship between automatic thoughts and core
beliefs through a cognitive-behavioral lens. Students discuss how they might explain the
relationship between these concepts, or even share stories about their own struggles with
negative self-talk. Additionally, the downward arrow technique might be introduced such that
students discuss how this process works and when it might be beneficial. An experiential element
is often involved, whereby instructors engage students by discussing how they understand
automatic thoughts and core beliefs in order to construct a more refined sense of conceptual
interconnectedness. Yet it remains a conceptual process, addressing implications and explaining
the interdependency of concepts in a top-down fashion.
A phenomenological approach to teaching counseling concepts focuses on the immediate
experiences of students. It does not assume that core beliefs, as a theoretical construct, is a
beneficial notion for understanding self-valuation (Wilkinson & Hanna, 2016). Students are
instead asked to examine concepts in terms of the psychological phenomena found in their
immediate apperception. In other words, students are led to explore their own experience of, for
example, automatic thoughts as a directly accessible phenomenon. Rather than explain automatic
thoughts as “things that the patient tells himself” (Beck, 1967, p. 321), an instructor may have
students recall a recent embarrassing experience in vivid detail and explore whether selfdeprecating internal statements arise alongside the recollection. Students might then be asked to
engage in exercises such as the call and response writing assignment (see Wilkinson & Dewell,
2019 for details) to examine how abstracted concepts can be deconstructed and thus translated

into a more concrete, experiential phenomenon. This is a descriptive and bottom-up process,
requiring the activation of direct experiences such that students learn about concepts through
direct apperception rather than abstract construction.
Arguably, this bottom-up approach may also be a necessary component of empathy
training. If it is indeed possible to grow the empathy of counselors-in-training (Ridley et al.
2011; Ivey et al., 1968), then it seems beneficial to consider whether the training process might
require experiential elements that are grounded in deconstruction. Does empathy grow as a
consequence of personal factors beyond the reach of counselor educators, or are there creative
techniques that might prove efficacious (Bayne & Jangha, 2016)? We would assert that empathy
training coalesces with a phenomenological pedagogy that seeks to transcend the view of
empathy as merely a cognitive or behavioral act within the natural attitude, putting students in
direct contact with their own experience of empathic attunement in various training situations.
The descriptive aspect of phenomenological inquiry, grounded within foundherentist principles
that reject subject-object distinctions, may prove fertile soil for growing new approaches to
empathy training that go beyond theoretical speculations and subjective explanations.
Discussion
The aims of constructivist and phenomenological pedagogies are not mutually exclusive, as
both seek to address shortcomings in traditional didactic approaches by making the experience of
students central to educational endeavors. However, it is important to distinguish between their
epistemological assumptions since those assumptions lead to pedagogical consequences.
Constructivism embraces the positions of coherentism and idealism to overcome the
consequences of foundationalism and realism within positivist teaching approaches.
Phenomenology take a different stance. As a bridge between the positions of realism and

idealism, as well as coherentism and foundationalism, phenomenology stands as a distinct
endeavor that draws upon elements of both constructivism and positivism.
A merging of constructivist and phenomenological approaches could be particularly
effective vis à vis flipped classrooms, which have been described as a constructivism-inspired
approach seeking to “address the gap between didactic education and clinical practice
performance” (Hawks, 2014; p. 264).

Typical flipped classrooms involve having students

observe pre-recorded video lectures before class and engage in more intensive group activities
during class (Bates, Almekdash, & Gilchrest-Dunnam, 2016; Moran & Milsom, 2015). As
discussed in the previous sections, the phenomenological approach to theory acquisition and
concept formation focuses on examining the immediate experience of mental health phenomena
and interconnected mental health processes. By providing students with traditional coverage
(e.g., video-recorded lectures) of course content outside of class, instructors can use face-to-face
class time as an opportunity to teach students phenomenological inquiry methods and to provide
guidance in assessing as well as deconstructing challenging concepts (Wilkinson & Dewell,
2019).
Empirical research is needed to establish the relative merits of phenomenological methods
as a supplement to constructivist practices. Researchers might consider developing instructional
activities based on phenomenological principles and practices outlined in this article and others
(see Wilkinson & Dewell, 2019; Wilkinson & Hanna, 2016) that can be tested in both content
and supervision-based classes. The review of epistemological positions in this article thus serves
to elucidate some of the core presuppositions that inform instructional practices as well as to
provide a foundation for considering alternative approaches. We maintain that phenomenology
can serve as a valuable pedagogical tool to enhance counselor education precisely because it

occupies a middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism as well as realism and
idealism. As such, it provides a unique epistemological frame of reference to guide the
development of innovative instructional strategies, methods, and practices in counselor
education. Considering these arguments, perhaps a new professional discourse on positivist,
constructivist, and phenomenological pedagogies in counselor education can be established.

References
Alston, W. P. (2010). Foundationalism. In J. Dancy, E. Sosa & M. Steup (Eds.), Blackwell
companions to philosophy: A companion to epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Bachtold, M. (2013). What do students “construct” according to constructivism in science
education? Research in Science Education, 46(6), 2477-2496.
Bayne, H. B. & Jangha, A. (2016). Utilizing improvisation to teach empathy skills in counselor
education. Counselor Education and Supervision, 55(4), 250-262.
Beck, A. T. (1967). The diagnosis and management of depression. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Boghossian, P. (2009). Fear of knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Bonjour, L. (1999). The dialectic of foundationalism and coherentism. In J. Greco & E. Sosa
(Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Buss, A. R. (1978). The structure of psychological revolutions. Journal of the History of the
Behavioral Sciences, 14, 57-64.
Confrey, J. & Kazak, S. (2006). A thirty-year reflection on constructivism in mathematics
education in PME. In A. Gutierrez & P. Boero (Eds.), Handbook of research on the
psychology of mathematics education. Boston, MA: Sense Publishers.
Cunningham, D. J. (1992). Assessing constructions and constructing assessments: A dialogue. In
T. H. Duffy & D. H. Jonassen (Eds.), Constructivism and the technology of instruction: A
conversation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Dorion, K. (2010). A defense of constructivism as scientific enquiry in science education.
Teacher Development, 14(4), 549-554.
Duffy, T. H. & Jonassen, D. H. (1992). Constructivism and technology of instruction: A
conversation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Ernst, P. (1998). Social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.
Føllesdal, D. (1988). Husserl on evidence and justification. In R. Sokolowski (Ed.), Edmund
Husserl and the phenomenological tradition (pp. 107–129). Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press.
Bates, J. E., Almekdash, H., & Gilchrest-Dunnam, M. J. (2016). The flipped classroom: A brief,
brief history. In L. S. Green, J. R. Banas, & R. A. Perkins (Eds.), The flipped college
classroom: Conceptualized and re-conceptualized (pp. 3-11). New York: Springer.
Guiffrida, D. A. (2005). The emergence model: An alternative pedagogy for facilitating selfreflection and theoretical fit in counseling students, Counselor Education and
Supervision, 44(3), 201-213.
Haack, S. (1993). Evidence and inquiry: Towards reconstruction in epistemology. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Hanna, F. J., Wilkinson, B. D., & Givens, J. (2017). Recovering the original phenomenological
research method: An exploration of Husserl, Yoga, Buddhism, and new frontiers in
humanistic counseling. The Journal of Humanistic Counseling, 56(2), 144-162.
Hansen, J. T. (2006). Counseling theories within a postmodernist epistemology: New roles for
theories in counseling practice. Journal of Counseling and Development, 84(3), 291-297.
Hawks, S. J. (2014). The flipped classroom: now or never? AANA journal, 82(4), 264-269.

Herrnstein, R. J., & Boring, E. G. (1965). A sourcebook in the history of psychology. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Hickman, L. A., Neubert, S., & Reich, K. (2009). John Dewey: Between pragmatism and
constructivism. New York: Fordham University Press.
Husserl, E. (1931). Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. (B. Gibson, Trans.).
New York: Collier Books. (Original work published 1913)
Husserl, E. (1965). Philosophy as rigorous science. In Q. Lauer, (Ed.), Phenomenology and the
crisis of philosophy. New York: Harper-Row. (Original work published 1910)
Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1936)
Husserl, E. (2000). Logical investigations. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1901)
James, W. (1977). Does consciousness exist? In J. J. McDermott, (Ed.), The writings of William
James: A comprehensive edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. (Original work
published 1890)
Johnston, J. S. (2009). Deweyan inquiry: From education theory to practice. Albany: SUNY
Press.
Karagiorgi, Y. & Symeou, L. (2005). Translating constructivism into instructional design:
Potential and limitations, Educational Technology and Society, 8(1), 17-27.
Kirschner, P. A. (2009). Epistemology or pedagogy: That is the question. In S. Tobias & T. M.
Duffy (Eds.), Constructivist instruction: Success or failure? (pp. 144-157). New York:
Taylor-Francis.
Kirschner, P. A., Sweller, J., & Clark, R. E. (2006). Why minimal guidance during instruction
does not work: An analysis of the failure of constructivist, discovery, problem-based,
experiential, and inquiry-based teaching, Educational Psychologist, 41(2), 75-86.
Korcuska, J. S. (2016). In the spirit of what might be lost: Troubling the boundaries of good fit.
Counselor Education and Supervision, 55(3), 154-158.
Lehrer, K. (2010). Coherentism. In J. Dancy, E. Sosa & M. Steup (Eds.), Blackwell companions
to philosophy: A companion to epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Lochhead, J. (1991). Making math mean. In E. von Glasersfeld (Ed.), Radical constructivism in
mathematics education. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
McAuliffe, G. J. & Eriksen, K. (2002). Teaching strategies for constructivist and developmental
counselor educators. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
McAuliffe, G. J. & Eriksen, K. (1999). Toward a constructivist and developmental identity for
the counseling profession: The context-phase-stage-style model, Journal of Counseling
and Development, 77, 267-280.
Merrill, M. (1991). Constructivism and instructional design, Educational Technology, 31(5),
45-53.
Moran, K., & Milsom, A. (2015). The flipped classroom in counselor education. Counselor
Education and Supervision, 54(1), 32-43.
Nelson, M. L. & Neufeldt, S. A. (1998). The pedagogy of counseling: A critical examination.
Counselor Education and Supervision, 38(2), 70-88.
Norcross, J. C. & Wampold, B. E. (2010). What works for whom: Tailoring psychotherapy to the
person, Journal of Clinical Psychology, 67(2), 127-132.
Payne, C. R. (2009). Information technology and constructivism in higher education:
Progressive learning frameworks. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference.

Pegues, H. (2007). Of paradigm wars: Constructivism, objectivism, and postmodern stratagem,
The Educational Forum, 71(4), 316-329.
Phillips, D. C. (1995). The good, the bad, and the ugly: The many faces of constructivism,
Educational Researcher, 24(7), 5-12.
Piaget, J. (1977). Science of education and the psychology of the child. New York: Penguin.
Prawat, R. S. & Floden, R. E. (1994). Philosophical perspectives on constructivist views of
learning, Educational Psychologist, 29, 37-48.
Pritchard, A. & Woollard, J. (2010). Psychology for the classroom: Constructivism and social
learning. New York: Routledge.
Proulx, J. (2008). Some differences between Maturana and Verla's theory of cognition and
constructivism, Complicity: International Journal of Complexity and Education, 5(1),
11-26.
Quine, W. V. (1990). Pursuit of truth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rosenshine, B. (2009). The empirical support for direct instruction. In S. Tobias & T. M. Duffy
(Eds.), Constructivist instruction: Success or failure? New York: Taylor and Francis.
Schunk, D. H. (2012). Learning theories: An educational perspective. Boston: Pearson.
Susen, S. (2015). The Postmodern Turn in the Social Sciences. London: Macmillan.
Tobias, S. (2010). Generative learning theory, paradigm shifts, and constructivism in educational
psychology: A tribute to Merl Wittrock, Educational Psychologist, 45(1), 51-54.
Tobias, S. & Duffy, T. M. (2009). The success or failure of constructivist instruction: An
introduction. In S. Tobias & T. M. Duffy (Eds.), Constructivist instruction: Success or
failure? New York: Taylor and Francis.
Tobin, K. (1993). The Practice of constructivism in science education. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Ultanir, E. (2012). An epistemological glance at the constructivist approach: Constructivist
learning in Dewey, Piaget, and Montessori, International Journal of Instruction, 5(2),
195-212.
Van Merrienboer, J. J. G. & Kirschner, P. A. (2007). Ten steps to complex learning. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1965). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wampold, B. E. (2001). The great psychotherapy debate: Models, methods, and findings. New
York: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Wilkinson, B. D. & Dewell, J. A. (2019). Cognitive complexity: Differentiation and integration
in counseling practice and training. Journal of Counseling and Development.
Wilkinson, B. D. & Hanna, F. J. (2016). New horizons in counselor pedagogy: the intersection of
constructivist concepts and phenomenological awareness. The Journal of Humanistic
Counseling, 55(1), 2-19.
Wells, G. (1994). The complimentary contributions of Halliday and Vygotsky to a languagebased theory of learning, Linguistics and Education, 6, 41-90.
Zaner, R. M. (1970). The way of phenomenology: Criticism as a philosophical discipline. New
York, Pegasus.

